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CHAPTER 7 - IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
PARTITION
How can any outside body complement a plan for
a territory opposed by both the majority of the
population of that territory and all the surviving
states?  Only if the outside power had enough
military, legal and moral clout.  The idea,
however, of _____ the U.N. moral clout with the
U.K. military and legal clout, backed up, pick up,
by U.S. economic might, was a non-starter.
After all, in the 1939 White Paper, the U.K.
had repudiated the terms of the Mandate with
respect to using Palestine as a homeland for Jews
when Jews were most desperate for a homeland.
After World War II, the U.K. had consistently
refused to allow 100,000 European  Jewish refugees,
the remnants of the Holocaust, into Palestine
against minority of Western public _____,
particularly in the U.S.A.
The U.K. had gone further, participating
actively in the _____ over the IRO constitution to
deny any IRO role in resettling the refugees in
Palestine.  The U.K. ignored the recommendations of
the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, and were
particularly _____ over _____ support for immediate
admission of the 100,000 refugees.  Formally, the
U.K. had it perfectly clear that they would only
co-operate with a U.N. recommendation if the
recommendation was not opposed by either of the
disputants.  Therefore, if the recommendation was
for a federal state of some sort or, better yet, a
waiting state with Jewish minority rights, and if
the U.S. could persuade the U.S. to get the
Zionists to co-operate or threaten to use force to
bring them into line, then there was a possibility
of U.K. co-operation.  But there was not real
prospect of U.K. co-operation or implementation of
the recommendation was for Partition.
What could not have been anticipated perhaps
was the degree and extent of U.K. non co-operation.
Britain moved up the date of its withdrawal for
Palestine to May 15th.  Britain refused to allow
the Palestine Commission entry to Palestine until
the last moment - May 1st, two weeks prior to the
termination of the Mandate.  Britain refused the
right of any of its _____ to work for any _____
authority, whether _____, Jews or U.N.  Britains
non co-operation amounted to virtual sabotage of
the U.N. recommendation.
Thus the best of the three key factors
necessary to the success of Partition by peaceful
means was missing.  This non co-operation was
paralleled by and probably reinforced the momentary
violent opposition of the belligerents.  In the
face of Britain non co-operation, in the faces of
a _____ Arab commitment against Partition, in the
face of the increasing violence in Palestine
itself, the implementation of UNSCOP's Partition
recommendation was bound to be different.
The Swedish representative on the vote prior to
partition summarized its essential weaknesses.
"My government....                      view"
Power and administrative organization.  Those
were the essential weaknesses.  There were two
areas to attack the problem, the role of the
Security council and the structure and function of
the Untied Nations Palestine Commission.
A _____ committee composed of Canada, Gustula,
the Soviet Union and the Untied States was found to
work on the problem of implementation.  Given the
rising tide of violence, the Swedish representative
had already administered the possible future
overtures of the Palestine Commission Board,
"It may.....     _____"
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What did they recommend.  Since Britain had
assumed an _____ _____, the regional partition plan
had to be modified with respect to the _____ date,
giving the Palestine Commission only a few months
to get organized.  On the other hand, Jewish and
Arab _____ _____ of Government and militia were
being organized to assume direct governmental
responsibility and the Britain would continue to
administer the territory in the _____ _____.  In
other words, the U.N. was backing away from any
_____ or resident legal authority in the direct
administration of the Arabs and Jews parts of
Palestine.  The Palestine Committees would only
have direct legal and administrative
responsibilities for Jerusalem.
Thus, with the exception of Jerusalem, the U.N.
was moving further and further away from acting as
a _____ legal and administrative authority.  But
even with respect to Jerusalem, it was not clear
how the U.N. would become the successor legal
authority to Britain.  Presumably, the U.N. was to
act like the Jewish and Arab _____ _____ to
directly assume de facto legal and administrative
authority.  But, unlike the Jewish and Arab groups,
the U.N. lacked a militia, lacked a constituency
were given very limited terms of reference and, in
the end, was a _____ weak group.
The Palestine Commission was certainly too weak
to serve as a watchdog of the Arab and Jewish
transferred governments to ensure they held to the
Partition agreement.  In fact, the _____ of the
commission was notable for its lack of supporters
of partition.
The commission representing Bolivia, Panama,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark and the Philippines had no
authority or power of decision, no great political
weight, and no virtue of loyalty to the idea of the
creation of the Jewish state. _____ Lisicky, the
hesitant Czechoslovakian, lacked decisiveness and
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daring.  Federspiel, the Dane, and the delegate of
the Philippines, the 
country that had changed its mind three times and
only in the end agreed to vote for partition, were
among its members.
It seemed as though this composition had been
deliberately chosen to deprive the body of all
power, authority and capacity for effective action.
Many thus believed it was the retort of the anti-
Zionist forces intent upon whittling down the
resolution and defeating it on the enforcement
level.(1)
In fact, the Palestine Commission would never
set foot in Palestine.  An advance group, headed by
the Commission's chief secretary, Pablo de
Azcarate(2) did go to Palestine in _____.  Its main
efforts were to _____.
The _____ like of attach of the United Nations
lay in resorting to the Security Council.  The
Security Council's role (or linkage to Palestine)
was _____ _____.  Though it had not been foreseen
that the Security Council would have to act to
counter a large-scale Arab invasion from outside of
Palestine(1), it was clear from the start that
there would be violent Arab opposition to and
obstruction of partition.
On passage of the resolution, Lie had
immediately gone into action to garner support for
backing the resolution with force to avoid a loss
of confidence in the United Nations.  His major
worry was that the Great Powers would just sit back
and let the two sides fight it out.
They would be tacitly admitting that the
United Nations was a useless instrument in
attempting to preserve peace.(2)
In December 1947, Lie set in motion Secretariat
studies of the possibility of creating an
international peace force.  Lie later told the
Palestine Commission,
"You are entitled...to be confident that in
the event is should prove 4
necessary, the security Council will assume
its full measure of responsibility in
implementation of the Assembly's resolution.
You have a right to assume, as I assume, that
in such a situation the security Council will
not fail to exercise to the fullest, and
without exception, every necessary power
entrusted to it by the Charter in order to
assist you in fulfilling your mission."(3)
Lie realized at the time that the statement was
bold, but he hoped it would help him get the
Security Council to act, if necessary.  His fears
were better guidelines for the future than his
hopes.
The United Nations Palestine Commission duly
reported to the Security Council on February 16,
1948, that it would be unable to implement
partition without military forces of adequate
strength.  It depicted the implications of not
backing up the will of the United Nations in very
stark terms:
In the view of the Commission, a basic issue
of international order is involved.  A
dangerous and tragic precedent will have been
established if force, or the threat of force,
is to prove an effective deterrent to the will
of the United Nations.(1)
Bunche, the principal secretary of the
Commission, estimated that one mechanized division
would suffice to keep peace, since it would only be
needed to work alongside the Haganah to protect the
Jewish areas.(2)  The Jewish Agency thought that
10,000 troops would be adequate.  But the Palestine
Commission itself wanted 100,000.(3)
Differences of opinion about the number of
troops needed were, in the event, an academic
debate because none were to be provided despite
Lie's prodding and despite the dire implications of
not giving forceful backing to the resolution.
Relations between Security Council members would
dictate 5
inactivity on the part of the Council.
At this point in time, United States objections
stood in the way of the formation of an
international police force.  A police force was
anathema to Washington for a number of reasons.  At
the time of the partition vote, Truman had
unequivocally stated that the United States would
not commit armed forces to implement partition.(4)
The United States would argue that the Security
Council was not authorized to take enforcement
action to enforce a political settlement, but only
to remove an actual threat to peace.(5)  This
option was shared by a number of other members of
the United Nations.  But its use by the Americans
as a justification for not authorizing enforcement
was somewhat disingenuous.  A legal paper prepared
in the State Department supported the finding of a
United Nations legal study that the United Nations
was entitled to use force to implement partition.
The true justification for American objections
to enforcement measures lay elsewhere.  A very
obvious explanation was concern about further
affronting the Arabs.  The Policy Planning Staff
argued against American participation in
enforcement activities based on the fear that this
would lead to suspension or cancellation of base
rights, pipeline construction contacts and a
decline or even an embargo on United States trade
with the Arabs.(1)
The Soviets had sponsored a putsch in
Czechoslovakia.  the Italian Communist party seemed
poised to win the Italian elections.  by March of
1948, an atmosphere of crisis enveloped Washington.
On March 5th, General CLay in Berlin sent a top
secret telegram to the Director of Intelligence of
the Army General Staff saying,
Within last few weeks, I have felt a subtle
change in Soviet attitude which I cannot
define but which now gives me a feeling that
it [war] may 6
come with dramatic suddenness.(2)
On March 17, 1948, truman gave a special
message to Congress on the "critical" situation in
Europe, recommending immediate measures to build up
military power, including universal military
training, selective service, and an increase in the
military budget of 25%.(3)  Preoccupied as it was
with a perceived threat in europe from its most
powerful enemy, the U.S. administration was loathe
even to consider sending troops to the Middle East.
Likewise, it refused to countenance the possibility
of sending Soviet or a Soviet proxy's troops to
Palestine.
As an added consideration, truman adamantly
refused to take up Britain's burden in Palestine.
The United States, according to Truman's
instruction, was
"not going to pick up the present United
Kingdom's responsibility for the maintenance
of law and order in Palestine."(1)
The State department echoed truman's fear that
Britain was trying to corner the United States in
Palestine,
Rusk warned that the United Kingdom would like
to trap us into an arrangement where we would
have to take on the responsibility of
government which the United Nations might not
be able to handle.(2)
In short, the American policy was to thrust
responsibility onto the United Nations while
denying the U.N. the tools to fulfill that
responsibility.(3)  Great Britain was hellbent on
escaping enforcement.  the U.N.'s policy was
getting nowhere fast.
The U.N. policy was  based on three pillars, as
described by Lester Pearson of Canada:
... the plan proposed by Subcommittee 1 was
feasible; both theoretically,
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practically, it was capable of being put into
effect.  Three factors were particularly
important.  In the first place, he was firmly
convinced that the U.K. would cooperate with
the commission in the implementation of any
plan accepted by two-thirds of the Members of
the United Nations.  Secondly, the support of
the permanent members of the Security Council
was essential.  Lastly, it was to be hoped
that the people of Palestine, as well as all
the Members of the United Nations, would
accept a decision taken by a two-thirds
majority.(4)
All three pillars were _____.  The U.K. did not
co-operate and was deliberately obstructive in the
administration steps necessary to implement the
plan and adamantly refused to participate in any
enforcement _____.  Why would anyone  believe that
moral persuasion of even a two-thirds U.N. vote
would force a sovereign state to risk its
diminishing power and _____ economic strength in a
perhaps futile effort which conflicted with its own
self-interest?
The presumption that the Security Council would
back the policy was also naive.  though the
responsibility of the determination in East-West
relations and the accelerated _____ of Soviet-_____
_____ could not perhaps have been contemplated,,
the rivalry could.  More importantly, the
consistent and increasing U.S. opposition to
U.S.S.R. involvement, and, hence, Security Council,
involvement had never _____ or waivered.  though
the U.S. seemed to behave as a Yo-Yo on the other
key issues, one would not hope for a different U.S.
behaviour in one of the key areas where it had been
persistently consistent and _____.
Finally to hope the support of the population
of Palestine, in particular, the majority
population of Arabs, ran counter to the previous 30
years of 8
experience and history now inherited by the shame,
humiliation and anger that fueled Arabs _____ and
whether __________________________________________.
the problem was not on these three pillars, but in
the fact that the policy makers had constituted
pillars of ______ _____ on horse rather than hand
analysis.
If their were these pillars to the U.N. policy
role, there was a _____ implement pillar of hope,
_____ resided _____ the U.N.
Whatever the U.N. was or was not able to
accomplish, it was hoped that he individual members
of U.N., particularly those who voted for
partition, would back partition with determination
and resolution.  Even this hope _____ _____ is not
only the U.S.A., but the expression of that hope
reneged via that commitment and determination.
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